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so as to challenge the authority of a plant supervisor is grounds
for disciplinary action short of discharge. 5
Some arbitrators have mitigated disciplinary penalities be-
cause of civil or criminal charges brought against the employee.
They have felt that the employer should have a more limited
right of discipline when a participant is a defendant in a legal
action. Others have upheld the employer's prerogative irrespec-
tive of penalties imposed outside the plant. The latter view
was enunciated by Mr. Clark Kerr, arbitrator, in In re Pioneer
Mill Company, Ltd.574
The arbitrator is not concerned with the appropriateness
of penalties under the law, if any, but solely with the pro-
priety of disciplinary action by the company. The question
before the arbitrator is, aside from such penalties as society
may see fit to assess, what additional penalties, if any,
should be placed against these men by the company.,8
Although penal or civil judgments against the erring employee,
or litigation of any sort whereby the employee would stand costs
of defending an action, should not finally determine penalties,
most arbitrators recognize such a circumstance as limiting the
employer's right upon the theory that full punishment has been
rendered by the judiciary.;
WILLIAM R. HIRscH
DAMAGE TO, OR LOSS OF, MACHINES AND MATERIALS
It will surprise only the uninitiated that there are little more
than a score of arbitration awards dealing with damage to, or
destruction of, machines or materials as a ground for discipline
or discharge. The vast majority of disputes between employer
and employee are "decided" at the foreman level, or in informal
meetings between representatives of the workers and manage-
ment. And this would seem to apply particularly to difficulties
arising out of the types of wrong-doing considered in this note.
Nevertheless, the cases which have arisen permit of some gen-
57. In re Verdun Mfg. Company, Inc. and Industrial Trades Union of
America, Verdun Mfg. Company Local, 10 LA 637 (1947).
58. In re Pioneer Mill Company, Limited and International Longshore-
men's and Warehousemen's Union, Local 144, Unit 9 (CIO), 6 LA 644(1947).
59. In re Verdun Mfg. Company, Inc. and Industrial Trades Union of
America, Verdun Mfg. Company Local, 10 LA 637 (1947).
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eralizations or rules of arbitration, which fall into the following
categories: (1) the definition of "just cause" as a ground for
discharge; (2) negligent or malicious destruction as a ground
for discharge; (3) general factors weighing against the em-
ployee; (4) mitigating factors; (5) employer's antagonism as
an independent ground for discharge; (6) sufficiency of evidence
and burden of proof.
I. THE DEFINITION OF "JUST CAUSE"
It is a common provision of collective bargaining agreements
that there may be discharge only for "just cause," and when
there is no such express provision, it is supplied by interpreta-
tion." The general meaning of the term "just cause" is sepa-
rately considered in another note in this issue; the present dis-
cussion is limited to its special application to cases of damage
to, or destruction of, machines and materials.2
II. NEGLIGENT OR MALICIOUS DESTRUCTION
Although the futility of establishing degrees of negligence has
been pointed out innumerable times by legal scholars, there
have been attempts to apply the terms "gross" and "wilful"
negligence in labor disputes arising out of the discharge of an
employee for damaging machines and materials. In In re Nine-
teen Hundred Corp., the arbitrator said:
1. 5 Labor Equipment % 66,003 (Prentice-Hall),
2. The arbitrator will sometimes use the broader phraseology "lack of
sufficient cause" in overruling a discharge when he might have said, with
more particularity, that the value of the damage done was too slight to
warrant discharge (In re Precision Film Laboratories, Inc. and Motion
Picture Laboratory Technicians, Local 702 [AFL], 3 LA 538 [1946]-
although the arbitrator found no "just cause" for discharge, he did impose
a disciplinary layoff), or there was insufficient evidence of fault on the
part of the employee (In re Modern Workshop, Inc. and United Furniture
Workers of America, Upholsterers Union, Local 76 [CIO], 8 LA 710S1947]. At all events, what constitutes "just cause" in any given case is
etermined by the facts of that case, and, as with the phrases "reason-
able man," "sufficient notice," "due care" and the like throughout our
law, the term is incapable of categorical exposition (the phrase was
employed by the arbitrator in the following awards: In re Pan American
Airways, Inc. and International Air Line Pilots' Ass'n [AFL], 11 LA 62[1948]; In re Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. and United Farm Equip-
ment and Metal Workers of America, Local 119 [CIO], 8 LA 177 [1947];
In re Harbison-Walker Refractories Co. and United Stone and Allied
Products Workers of America, Branches 75 & 76 [CIO], 8 LA 290 [1947];
and In re Reynolds Metals Company and United Steelworkers of America,
Local 3911 [CIO], 12 LA 76 [1949].
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Discharge should be imposed only for gross (or extreme)
negligence amounting to malicious destruction of company
property. For ordinary carelessness (such as is normally
present in shop operations) discharge is too severe a dis-
ciplinary measure.8
In contrast, the arbitrator in In re Harbison-Waker Refrac-
tories Co. stated that discharge was unjustified where the con-
duct was "more thoughtless and negligent than wilful and
malicious.' Neither the division into "ordinary," "gross," and
"wilful" negligence, as suggested by the arbitrator in the former
case, nor the rule eliminating negligence entirely as ground for
discharge, as urged by the arbitrator in the latter case, seems
to be a realistic approach to the problem. The term "negligence"
should be used without benefit of adjectival inflection, and should
embrace all conduct showing a lack of reasonable care under
the circumstances. Whether the fault or the damage warrants
the penalty should be determined by an analysis of all the facts,
and the employer should not be required to sustain the often
impossible burden of proving intent or malice.
III. FACTORS WEIGHING AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE
A. Prior Untoward Conduct. It seems obvious that prior con-
duct of the same type as that out of which the discharge im-
mediately arose, should weigh- heavily against the contention
of the worker that the discharge was unjustified. The old meta-
phor concerning the straw which had such disastrous effects
upon the camel should be, and has been, given sympathetic ex-
pression by arbitrators. In another place in this issue the ad-
missibility of evidence of past similar acts is considered in more
detail. 'a It is sufficient to state here that such evidence is freely
received for the light it may throw upon the intentions of the
employee and the justice of the penalty; and this seems proper,
since arbitrations, after all, are intended to settle with justice
a dispute between two parties, who will, after settlement of the
dispute, go on sharing the same roof and the same problems.
Yet, prior negligent acts must be considered in the light of all
3. In re Nineteen Hundred Corporation and United Electrical, Radio
and Machine Workers of America, Local 931 (CIO), 6 LA 709 (1946).
3a. See supra note, "Evidence, Burden, and Quantum of Proof."
4. In re Harbison-Walker Refractories Company and United Stone and
Allied Products Workers of America, Branches 75 & 76 (CIO), 8 LA 290
(1947).
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the other factors in the case, and may be overridden by them.5
Although the disciplinary action imposed by an employer for
the damage to, or loss of, machines or materials has been de-
fended, on the grounds that the employee has a past record of
absenteeism, insubordination, and so forth, in none of these
cases has the arbitrator stated that the employee's previous
delicts should be considered against him. Yet, such evidence
has been received and may well have influenced the arbitrator's
decision. There seems to be no valid reason to exclude evidence
of the employee's prior transgressions simply because they differ
in kind from the act which constitutes the ground for the dis-
charge. The cumulative effect of several acts of negligence may
count more strongly against the employee than tardiness, ab-
senteeism and other misconduct, coupled with the negligent
breaking of a machine part, but such evidence should be received
as bearing upon the severity of the penalty at least.
B. Warnings and Instructions. When the employee has re-
ceived warnings because of his careless methods in the past, or
when he has received instructions or been warned of the care
required in the job, these facts can be offered in evidence against
him when his discharge for carelessness resulting in damage is
contested. That prior warnings and instructions do not carry
much weight, however, is attested by the cases.6
C. Failure to Report. Damage. The only case bearing on this
point is one in which a machine part was broken wilfully in a
fit of anger, and the fact that the damage was not reported was
not an indispensable element in the employer's case.7 However,
it is not difficult to imagine cases in which the failure to make
5. See, In re Albert J. Bartson, Inc. and Textile Workers Union of
America, Local 515 (CIO), 5 LA 222 (1946) (Section IV-C, this note).
6. In re Albert J. Bartson, Inc. and Textile Workers Union of America,
Local 515 (CIO), 5 LA 222 (1946); In re Nineteen Hundred Corporation
and United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America, Local 931(CIO), 6 LA 709 (1946); and see In re Tri-United Plastics Corporation
and United Gas, Coke and Chemical Workers of America, Local 242 (CIO),
2 LA 398 (1946), in which it was held that the fact that the employee was
performing the job for the first time and had not received proper instruc-
tions (according to the contention of the Union) would not be considered
in mitigation where the carelessness and inefficiency of the employee re-
sulted in substantial damage to a machine.
7. In re Bryant Heater Company and International Union, United Auto-
mobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers, Local 337 (CIO),
3 LA 346 (1946); the discharge was upheld primarily because of the will-
ful nature of the act, but the arbitrator also listed the fact that no report
of the damage was made as a further ground for the decision.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1949/iss1/14
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a report of the damage would be a most important factor-for
example, when an employee negligently damaged a machine the
function of which was to cut precision parts for fine watches,
and through the worker's attempt to "cover up" his careless-
ness by failing to inform the foreman of the damage, the parts
were imperfectly cut so that the watches produced were of in-
ferior quality. The negligence alone might not warrant dis-
charge, but coupled with failure to report the damage, it might
be sufficient.
D. Seriousness of Damage. When the loss to the company is
considerable, the arbitrator is more likely to hold that the dis-
cipline imposed was not without "just cause." In In re Tr.-
United Plastics Corp., substantial damage to a machine from
the worker's carelessness prevailed over the contention that the
employee was not given proper instruction and was performing
the job for the first time; discharge was held justified.8 How-
ever, there is no inflexible rule that the severity of the discipline
should be in direct proportion to the value of the property
destroyed or the amount of damage done. Other factors often
vary the result, as pointed out in a previous sectionY It seems
that, if in the case last cited, the loss had been the proximate
result of erroneous instructions or, if discharge had not been
the established penalty for the type of negligence involved, the
discharge would not have been sustained.'0
E. Violation of Plant Rules. Ordinarily, violation of a plant
rule resulting in damage to, or loss of, machines or materials
constitutes a ground for some disciplinary action. If the rule
specifies what disciplinary measures will be taken, and if the
rule is deemed reasonable by the arbitrator, the imposition of
that discipline by the employer will be upheld.' 1 If there is no
specification of the discipline which may be imposed, the arbi-
8. In re Tri-United Plastics Corporation and United Gas, Coke and
Chemical Workers of America, Local 242 (CIO), 2 LA 398 (1946).
9. See Section IV--"Mitigating Factors."
10. In In re Potash Company of America and International Union of
Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, Local 415 (CIO), 3 LA 403 (1946), al-
though the ties and switches along 1500 feet of railroad track were de-
stroyed, the arbitrator reinstated the discharged employee, who had driven
the freight train whose defective wheels had caused the damage, since there
was no substantiation for a finding of negligence; accord, In re Ford Motor
Company and United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America, Local 600 (CIO), 6 LA 1007 (1946).
11. Jacobs Transfer Award, 5 Labor Equipment 67,208 (Prentice-
Hall).
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trator will uphold, overrule, or modify the action taken by the
employer, after considering all the facts of the situation, taking
into account the discipline which the employer has imposed in
the past for violation of the rule and the relative importance of
enforcing obedience to it."
2
Two cases have arisen involving company rules making care-
less damage to plant equipment cause for discharge. In the
earlier of the cases, the rule itself was not questioned, 3 but in
the later case the rule was declared unreasonable, because it
did not distinguish between "degrees of carelessness."' 4 If the
purpose and effect of the rule is to preclude the arbitrator's in-
quiry whether discharge was too severe a penalty, the decision
cannot be sustained; but if the rule is intended merely to ap-
prise workers of the employer's intention to impose discipline if
they are careless in their work, even to the extent of discharge
in a proper case, the rule should be given the same weight as a
warning to each employee individually that the company will
insist on careful work. 5
As another section of this note points out,'6 if the employer
chooses not to enforce a plant rule, and allows its violation to
become a general practice, he cannot impose discipline later for
a breach of the rule which results in loss to the company.' 7
IV. MITIGATING FACTORS
A. Length of Service and Prior Good Record. Length of ser-
vice with a particular employer and a prior good employment
12. In In re Pan American Airways, Inc. and International Air Line
Pilots' Ass'n, (AFL), 11 LA 62 (1948), an airline pilot was held properly
discharged for violation of the regulations of the company and of the Civil
Aeronautics Association since the violation of such rules exposed the pas-
sengers and company property to undue hazard. See also: In re Goodyear
Decatur Mills and United Textile Workers of America, Local 88 (AFL),
11 LA 303 (1948); and In re Gibbons Engineering and Machine Company
and Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers, Local 25 (CIO),
2 LA 550 (1946).
13. In re Potash Company of America and International Union of Mine,
Mill and Smelter Workers, Local 415 (CIO), 3 LA 403 (1946) (the arbi-
trator found that there was no substantiation for a finding of willful or
careless destruction of property).
14. In re Nineteen Hundred Corporation and United Electrical, Radio
and Machine Workers of America, Local 931 (CIO), 6 LA 709 (1946).
15. See Section 11-B of this note.
16. See Section IV-D of this note.
17. In re Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company and United Farm
Equipment and Metal Workers of America, Local 119 (CIO), 8 LA 177
(1947).
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record weigh heavily in mitigation of the employee's delict. In
In re National Lead Co.,"8 and in In re Ford Motor Co.,21 in
which the employers and the employees produced conflicting evi-
dence on the issue of negligence, the arbitrators gave greater
weight to the testimony of the workers because of the length
of their service, unblemished by any prior acts meriting disci-
pline.20 In strict legal theory, the cases might better have been
decided on the ground that the employer failed to sustain the
burden of proof; certainly, the arbitrators were justified in con-
sidering the long years of service to the company as a factor in
weighing the evidence. In In re Harbison-Walker Refractories
Co., although the action of the discharged workers (engaging
in "target practice" with packing hatchets) smacked of wanton
conduct, the arbitrator held that the employee's records of "sat-
isfactory conduct" in the past, made discharge too severe a
penalty. He imposed a disciplinary lay-off instead, further sup-
porting his opinion by declaring that the conduct "was more
thoughtless and negligent than wilfull and malicious. '21 Again,
in In re Nineteen Hundred Corporation, the arbitrator com-
muted a discharge to a disciplinary lay-off, because the employee
had no prior offenses and was "guilty of only ordinary care-
lessness.'22
B. Slight Damage. Whether the fact that the loss was not
substantial will be considered in mitigation is so far determined
by the facts of each case, that generalization is difficult, if not
impossible; and the pattern of the cases runs from one extreme
to the other. In In re Albert J. Bcrtson, the arbitrator ignored
18. In re National Lead Company, Texas Mining and Smelting Division
and International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, Local 412
(CIO) 11 LA 993 (1948).
19. In re Ford Motor Co. and United Automobile, Aircraft and Agri-
cultural Implement Workers of America, Local 600 (CIO), 6 LA 1007
(1946).
20. In the case first cited the worker had been employed for 13 years,
and in the latter case for 24 years.
21. In re Harbison-Walker Refractories Company and United Stone and
Allied Products Workers of America, Branches 75 & 76 (CIO), 8 LA 290(1947).
22. In re Nineteen Hundred Corporation and United Electrical, Radio
and Machine Workers of America, Local 931 (CIO), 6 LA 709 (1946). See
also In re Albert J. Bartson, Inc. and Textile Workers Union of America,
Local 515 (CIO), 5 LA 222 (1946). In the Intermountain Transportation
Award, 5 Labor Equipment 67,143 (Prentice-Hall), an employee who
negligently drove an empty bus off a curve on a lonely mountain road,
was ordered reinstated in view of his past record, upon the agreement of
the employee to pay for damage to the bus.
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the fact that the damage was small and based his judgment
entirely on the fact that discharge was not an established penalty
for that type of infraction,23 while in In re Precision Film
Laboratories, Inc., the arbitrator held that negligent destruction
of a portion of a customer's film, coupled with other careless-
ness, and with tardiness and absenteeism, was insufficient to
warrant discharge (though a lay-off was imposed) because the
customer retained a duplicate, thus minimizing the loss to the
company.24
In three cases the fact that the damage was slight was held to
be no mitigating factor; and in each case discharge was sus-
tained. In one case, a machine part was broken wilfully in a fit
of anger and no report of the damage was made. The arbitrator,
quite justly, stated that discharge was not too severe a penalty
since the act was "... . a wanton disregard of instructions and in-
dicated no consideration for company property or rules. '25 In
another case, discharge was upheld because the employee, having
checked out a company tool and having failed to return it, re-
fused to pay for it in accordance with company policy, after
promising repeatedly to do so.28 In the third case, an airline
pilot's exercise of poor judgment endangered the lives of his
passengers and the property of his employer, although little
damage was actually done. It was held that the responsibilities
placed upon men of such calling, and the employee's prior acts
of negligence (which were much of the same type) made dis-
charge reasonable, despite the serious consequences to a pilot's
professional career of a discharge for exercising "poor judg-
ment.,,21
C. Novel Type of Discipline. In the only case decided on the
point, discharge of a worker was commuted to a disciplinary
lay-off when no evidence appeared that discharge was an estab-
lished penalty for the sort of carelessness of which the employee
23. In re Albert J. Bartson, Inc. and Textile Workers Union of America,
Local 515 (CIO), 5 LA 222 (1946).
24. In re Precision Film Laboratories, Inc. and Motion Picture Labora-
tory Technicians, Local 702 (AFL), 3 LA 538 (1946).
25. In re Bryant Heater Company and International Union, United
Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers, Local 337
(CIO), 3 LA 346 (1946).
26. In re Gibbons Engineering and Machine Company and Industrial
Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers, Local 25 (CIO), 2 LA 550(1946).
27. In re Pan American Airways, Inc. and International Air Line Pilots'
Ass'n. (AFL), 11 LA 62 (1948).
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was guilty, although it appeared that the employee had twice
before been guilty of the same type of negligence and had re-
ceived warnings.28
D. Condonation of Violation of a Plant Rule. This problem
is quite similar to the preceding one, and again there is but
one case to serve as a basis for analysis. The case is In re Allis-
Chalmzers Manufacturing Co., in which an employee was given
a disciplinary lay-off for violation of a plant rule, which resulted
in damage to a machine. 29 The company contended that the
employee, in violation of a plant rule that the foreman was to
assign material to be worked on, had his own tubes drilled, that
he consequently obtained the wrong kind, and that he took that
risk by failing to consult the foreman. The union contended that
this rule was never enforced, and that workers were never
cautioned against getting their own materials. Finding evidence
to support the contentions of the union, the arbitrator held that
an employer may not condone a practice in violation of a plant
rule for a long time and then impose discipline when some loss
to the company results. He further stated:
The company assumes a risk of possible loss by not en-
forcing its plant rules over a long period and taking no
action to stop what it should have known was a general
practice.
The arbitrator's decision and reasoning seem sound, including
the new application of the phrase "assumption of risk."
V. EMPLOYER'S ANTAGONISM
In In re Modern Workshop, Inc.,30 an employee was discharged
for negligence resulting in the theft of his employer's car. The
employee left the car on the street outside a parking lot, relying
upon an assurance by the parking lot attendant that the car
would be put on the lot as soon as there was space. The arbi-
trator held that the discharge was without "cause" since the
employee took no more risk than a "reasonable and prudent
28. In re Albert 3. Bartson, Inc. and Textile Workers Union of America,
Local 515 (CIO), 5 LA 222 (1946) (the arbitrator was also influenced
by the fact that the worker had been employed at the plant for a period
of five years).
29. In re Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company and United Farm
Equipment and Metal Workers of America, Local 119 (CIO), 8 LA 177
(1947).
30. In re Modern Workshop, Inc. and United Furniture Workers of
America, Upholsterers Union, Local 76 (CIO), 8 LA 710 (1947).
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man." The employer then contended that the employee should
not be reinstated since the employer's antagonism because of
the loss of his car would lead to friction in the plant, in which
the parties to the arbitration worked side by side. The arbitrator
agreed that friction would inevitably follow reinstatement of
the employee but held that this did not justify a refusal to
reinstate.
VI. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF
The problems concerning the admissibility of evidence and
burden of proof are more fully dealt with in a separate note in
this issue of the Quarterly,3°" and will be referred to only briefly
here. Except for probationary workers, the burden of proving
that the discipline was justified rests with the employer,31 al-
though arbitrators in these cases seldom make use of the term
"burden of proof"; and at least one case has held that the em-
ployer must offer some evidence that discharge was an estab-
lished penalty for the carelessness of which the employee Was
guilty.32
VII. CONCLUSION
This review of the cases concerning damage to, and destruc-
tion of, machines and materials reveals no very startling con-
flicts among arbitrators. There is substantial agreement upon
the rules which should govern such disputes and even upon the
factors which should be considered in applying the rules. As
one would expect, when the employee inflicts a substantial loss
upon the company, his offense is serious enough to warrant dis-
charge in the absence of mitigating circumstances.
Perhaps the most unsatisfactory tendency in the cases is the
confusion surrounding the conception of "negligence." It could
30a. See supra note "Evidence, Burden and Quantum of Proof."
31. 5 Labor Equipment 66,003 (Prentice-Hall); In re Ford Motor
Company and United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America, Local 600 (CIO), 6 LA 1007 (1946); In re Tri-
United Plastics Corporation and United Gas, Coke and Chemical Workers
of America, Local 242 (CIO), 2 LA 398 (1946); In re Potash Company
of America and International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers,
Local 415 (CIO), 3 LA 403 (1946); In re National Lead Company, Texas
Mining and Smelting Division and International Union of Mine, Mill and
Smelter Workers, Local 412 (CIO), 11 LA 993 (1948); and In re Reynolds
Metals Company and United Steelworkers of America, Local 3911 (CIO),
12 LA 76 (1949).
32. In re Albert J. Bartson, Inc. and Textile Workers Union of America,
Local 515 (CIO), 5 LA 222 (1946).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1949/iss1/14
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
be expected that lay arbitrators would have trouble with this
term, and would fail to anticipate the difficulty of administering
such qualifications of it as "gross," "slight," and other terms
implying degree. Equally unfortunate is the temptation to
eliminate negligence as the basis for disciplinary action. In
-damaging or destroying material it requires little ingenuity to
cover up intention with the cloak of negligence. Accordingly,
arbitrators must, in the long run, accept the concept of negli-
gence as one of their working tools, but would do well to avoid
the pitfalls into which the case-law has fallen.
Finally, the arbitrators in this group of cases have shown
the same tendency, as in others, to admit rather freely evidence
which aggravates or mitigates the offense; and they have agreed
also what evidence has these effects. Accordingly, these cases,
.dealing as they do, with one of the most serious of industrial
problems, show the same tendency toward uniformity, resulting
largely from following legal analogies, that has been observed
in the arbitration of other disputes.
RICHARD C. ALLEN
DISHONESTY, DISLOYALTY AND THEFT
It might seem that an employee who has been guilty of theft
,or other dishonesty would in every case be subject to discharge.
Indeed, many labor-management contracts expressly make the
dishonesty of an employee a ground for summary discharge;
and, in any event, discharge or other discipline for theft or other
,dishonesty would fall squarely within the general requirement
that discipline and discharge are to be imposed only for "just
cause." Nevertheless, even a casual perusal of the reported arbi-
tration cases would reveal that most arbitrators are extremely
reluctant to discharge employees on these grounds. In the vast
majority of cases, the arbitrators search the record long and
,carefully for mitigating circumstances and generally impose
penalties much less severe than discharge.1
Few employers will hire a man whose record of previous
,employment shows that he has been discharged for theft or
1. A study of forty-two cases shows that in approximately 15 per cent
only was discharge permitted in cases of dishonest acts committed within
'the scope of employment. See infra, for a possible explanation of what
.seems a surprisingly low figure.
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